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Discussing Empathy and Critique in the Ethnography of Things Military: A Conversation 
 
Convened and edited by Sebastian Mohr, Birgitte Refslund Sørensen, and Matti Weisdorf 
 
Whenever we discuss fieldwork experiences with fellow anthropologists working on ’things military’, 
concerns over ethics, politics, and critique pop up as a matter of course. Though important in any field, 
these matters seem particularly conspicous and insistent in the military field. Meanwhile, 
anthropology of the military is garnering increasing attention in response to a changing global security 
landscape. This motivated us to organize this special Issue. In addition to collecting a number of original 
research articles, we thought it inspiring and fruitful to engage some of the leading and widely read 
ethnographers in this field in a virtual dialogue based on their personal experiences and viewpoints. 
Rather than aiming at a number of do’s and don’ts and normative utterances of what good 
ethnographic conduct should be, we aimed to elicit an exchange that stimulates an open and nuanced 
discussion of these most important questions. The five contributors who generously volunteered to 
share their views are:  
Eyal Ben-Ari. Ben-Ari has done ethnographic fieldwork in and on the Israeli army where he also served 
as an officer, after which he has explored the use of popular culture in the Japanese Self-Defence 
Forces. Moreover, Ben-Ari has been and is involved in several international research projects, 
engagements, which have given him detailed insights into the conditions of military anthropology and 
sociology worldwide. 
Zoë Wool. Wool has explored the embodied post-deployment lives of injured American soldiers 
residing in an army medical center as well as the popular figure of the soldier. In her work, Wool 
combines medical anthropology, queer theory, and disability studies through her interest in 
personhood and the body. Her recent research concerns issues of care in relation to war veterans and 
their families. 
Kevin McSorley. McSorley explores war, violence, and militarism by setting the body, embodiment, 
and sensory experiences center stage in the sociological and ethnographic imaginary of war and 
militarization. Concerned with how war is (un)done in and through embodiment, his work has 
contributed to an understanding of war and civil-military relations as embodied realities rather than 
just another means of politics. 
Sarah Hautzinger and Jean Scandlyn. Hautzinger’s and Scandlyn’s research has zoomed in on the 
psychological traumas of American soldiers when returning from deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Rather than only exploring these as individual medical pathologies, Hautzinger and Scandlyn attend to 
post-traumatic stress disorder as a cultural phenomenon that is as much a collective social 





The dialogue between Ben-Ari, Wool, McSorley, and Hautzinger and Scandlyn took its point of 
departure in the following questions: What is critique or critical ethnography when working on things 
military? What ethnographic moment do you recall from your own fieldwork in which the dynamic 
between empathy and critique was at stake or seemed emphasized? And what dimensions of empathy 
and critique are contained in these ethnographic moments and what is captured by them? 
Our panelists were invited to respond to one question at a time. The answers of each panelist were 
circulated for further comments before attending to the next question. The entire dialogue was based 
on e-mail correspondence moderated by the editors of this special issue. When posing the first 
question, a set of texts on the broader topics of critique and empathy was circulated as a source of 
inspiration to roundtable participants as well as the authors of the individual articles in this special 
issue prior to submission (Bubandt & Willerslev 2015; Butler 2009; Fassin 2017; Foucault 2007; 
Hemmings 2012; Hollan & Throop 2011; Latour 2004; Scheper-Hughes 1995; Throop 2010). The 
following conversation is the result of that digitally moderated roundtable and was shortened and 





What is critique or critical ethnography when working on things military? 
Zoë: In thinking of critique, I find Judith Butler’s formulation (after Foucault) of critical politics 
particularly helpful. As opposed to denunciation, Butler says the aim of critical politics is “to bring into 
relief the very framework of evaluation itself.” (Butler 2002: 214) The nature of the politics of this 
critical politics is complicated, and sometimes unsatisfying. How can we have a politics that is not 
evaluative? Not animated by a righteous sense of good and bad? Nancy Scheper Hughes (1995) is 
probably the best anthropological spokesperson for this position in anthropology, and I am usually glad 
that such righteous politics is out there (I strategically participate in it myself, though not in my 
intellectual work). At the same time, I am usually heartbroken by its collateral effects, and the 
foreclosures it entails (think here of Povinelli’s 2002 cunning of recognition). It might be illuminating 
to know that when I tell the story of my coming into academia and into my first research project with 
injured soldiers, it is usually the story of a disillusioned anti-war activist. 
So, what is critique when working on things military? For me, it is to bring into relief the deep logics 
according to which the arrangement and practices and imperatives of military life makes sense and 
hang together. It involves seriously asking ‘obvious’ questions—in particular about the logics that 
govern war injury and its aftermath among U.S. soldiers – and then following the proliferating 
questions down and out until the obvious can be understood as an artifact. It means offering an 
account of those arrangements, practices, and imperatives that opens up the possibility of things being 
otherwise, without celebrating alternatives per se, or even any one alternative in particular, as the 
solution to the problem of military life. In other words, it’s about making known so as to make room 
to maneuver. 
But in what ways does the context of things military specify any answer anyone might give? On the 
one hand, the nature of critique, and of critical ethnography (if we define that as ethnography that 
performs critique), is not dependent on context. Yet at the same time, there are ways in which the 
context of things military does specify the significance of critique. Critique of things military necessarily 
draws you into critical, and thereby destabilizing, conversations about the nature and limits of 
sovereignty, violence, the distribution of state responsibility and harm. I would also suggest that, when 
we’re talking about critical ethnographies of the people in institutionalized militaries that operate as 
an organ of a nation state (as opposed to, say, guerilla groups), we are also drawn to critical 
conversations about the place of a given military in its national imaginary, and questions of 
militarization more broadly. What this looks like in any given case depends on many details. Are we 
talking about a country with mandatory military service (and for whom)? A place where the military is 
allied with particular political parties or ideologies (which ones?), or figured primarily as antipolitical 
(in what ways?)? Along with many others (notably those working on gender and sexaulity), I would 
note that the ways that the military amplifies many cultural forms are central to normative national 
projects more generally, such as heteronormativity. In this way, the context of things military might 
bring these projects into starker relief, or offer a vantage point from which one can see them in some 
of their most explicitly institutionalized forms. So since things military are contiguous with things that 
appear elsewhere and otherwise, critique or critical ethnography of things military are then also far 






Kevin: What might make ethnography of the military critical? Given the fact that wars and resurgent 
militarisms are defining features of our intensely troubling times, and given, further, the relative 
paucity of ethnographic work on military-related phenomena, experiences and life-worlds, certainly 
when compared with the quantity of work undertaken on other major social institutions, I am tempted 
to say that the critical thing is simply that such work takes place at all. 
Firstly, whatever the particular detailed research questions, concerns, and curiosities that underpin 
any specific study might be, I would suggest that critical ethnographies of things military often trouble 
core theoretical ideas such as the military, militarism and militarization, treating them as open 
questions or sensitizing concepts, whose articulation and modification may be sought through 
empirical encounter, rather than understanding them as fixed categories to be simply identified or as 
stable containers of inquiry. In part, this is a result of the sites and scale at which ethnographic research 
typically happens, and how proximity works to trouble abstract understandings and pluralize 
conceptual vocabularies. Of course, on the one hand, militaries may be defined as abstract black-
boxes, thought and known primarily in terms of their officially state-sanctioned outputs, notably war-
preparation and the prosecution of bodily violence (although even this neat definition blurs as the 
remit of contemporary militaries increasingly encompasses diverse operations from peacekeeping to 
humanitarian relief). Ethnographic inquiry however illuminates the fundamental breadth and 
complexity of lived experiences that such potentialities depend upon; the internal differentiation, 
institutional undersides, and lived contradictions that constitute the messy workings, and failures, of 
the military machine; the wider cultures, socialities, intimacies and structures of feeling which forms 
of (post-)military being co-exist with and co-constitute. Indeed, at the level of lived experience, it 
fundamentally highlights the hybridity, entanglement and in-betweeness of lives and worlds that are 
at once military and civilian. So ‘military’ then may come less to name an imagined stable and fully 
knowable entity, and more the qualification of complex practices of worlding, self-government and 
interaction, a focus of boundary work that is continually performed and negotiated by numerous 
actors with their own epistemologies and critical capacities, a ‘glaringly obvious presence … [which is] 
an object of soldiers’ own constant commentary and critique’ (MacLeish 2015: 16). It is partly the 
granularity of ethnographic data, ‘when we not only abandon the totalities but embrace the splinters’ 
(Biehl and McKay 2012: 1223), that means that such ontological undoing may become apparent in 
critical ethnographic work. And this troubling of extant conceptual vocabularies is important not just 
for academic reasons, but also because wider public understandings of the military, war, soldiering 
and so on are often overdetermined by very specific culturally dominant tropes, including ideas about 
the fundamental division and incommensurability of civilian and military experience and an implied 
consequent circumscription of the possibilities of empathy. 
Secondly, I would suggest that ethnographic work on the military is fundamentally enhanced by being 
placed in dialogue with various traditions of critical thinking and praxis – Marxist, feminist, post-
colonial, etc. Indeed, I have specifically argued in previous work for an understanding of war and 
militarism as continuously shape-shifting but fundamentally embodied social institutions, and hence 
for the importance of engaging with wider critical thought on embodiment and the senses generally in 
order to try and illuminate an understanding of military experience. It is also important to say that 
while a desire to undertake various forms of critique – whether ideological revelation or genealogical 
analysis (Fassin 2017), the exposure of structuring contradictions (Belkin 2012), even a more 
compositionist and multiplicative critical assembly (Latour 2010) – may inspire ethnographic research 





mode of engagement in the heterogeneous situations and encounters of fieldwork. Indeed, embracing 
fascination and enchantment with things military may at certain times be a highly insightful research 
strategy, enabling critical reflection upon the structuring of militarist seduction (see McSorley 2016, 
Rech 2016). Ethnographic research will of course typically involve and invoke multiple and constantly 
changing feelings and modes of engagement, from curiosity and seduction to empathy and humility. 
Much of the time this may feel like the pragmatic amateurism of muddling through, particularly as 
attempts at studying up and researching sites of distinct power such as the military often complicates 
the undertaking any real participant observation, and rather necessitate a strategy of much more 
eclectic and opportunistic ‘polymorphous engagement’ (Gusterson 1997). 
 
Sarah and Jean: We’re less certain about what critique is than we are about what our approach to a 
critical ethnography on things military cannot be. It’s of some comfort that the circulated writings 
about critique often share these dispositions. Latour calls out attention to wars on this and that – 
culture, science, on terror – and wonders if scholarly critique doesn’t merely pile on (2004: 225). What 
we know about a critical ethnography about things military – and more broadly, about war – is that it 
cannot afford to be simply a critique of military-as-always-militarist, or a critique-as-war on warring 
itself. Ethnography, even critical and oppositional ethnography, takes a different route. 
In asking, what is critique, and what is critical ethnography on things military, a moment from before 
our fieldwork bubbles up. In 2003, a first-grade teacher reacted to news that the US and its allies were 
invading Iraq by saying the following: “I hope we blast the whole country into oblivion!” The venom 
and heartlessness in her statement so contrasted her dress, with dancing teddy-bears around the hem. 
The point it makes, for us, is simple: blasting that which one wishes to critique is too simple, and its 
reductive bellicosity creates problems and limitations later on. Far more defensible is critique as critical 
ethnography (Fassin 2017), which engages with complexity, and problematizes with an empathy that 
feels into the other person (Bubandt and Willerslev 2015:7). Ethnography does this by taking seriously 
the perspectives, indeed, taking the perspectives in order to take them on, of that which one 
anticipates opposing, invalidating, or deconstructing via critique. We want to suggest, then, sensitive 
critique requires us, to some extent, to become the object we seek to undo, in order, at least, to first 
understand it. Beware: contagion lies here. 
For us, this meant something visceral. In our book Beyond Post-Traumatic Stress: Homefront Struggles 
with the Wars on Terror we invoke not only war, but the process of doing ethnography about military 
communities in wartime, as a stenchful and sticky, terrifying labyrinth that draws one in, as a “situation 
where there is no clear way out, no sense of determining forward or backward movement, no exit” 
(Hautzinger & Scandlyn 2014: 32). More recently and more personally, Sarah presented “fuckedness” 
as an appropriately tragic-comic, autoethnographic effect from the dozens of contexts of our five years 
of fieldwork (Hautzinger 2015). Because it is our story, the fuckedness of the ethnographer-critic came 
in ways Sarah understood as feminized. On the one hand, in the ethnographic forays into military 
communities, she felt cast into, and expected to play, roles – the cheerleader, the listening ear of the 
caregiver-girlfriend nurse. On the other hand, having crossed so deeply into hostile terrain, having 
collaborated and entered into reciprocity with military partners, she clearly disappointed folks in the 
peace activist community. She felt accused of playing hostess, with symbolic overtones of promiscuity, 





Fieldworkers face these moments as we traverse territorialized lines, and at times, not surprisingly, we 
become tangled up in them. For Sarah, the lines drawn closest to home hurt the most. When a lefty 
colleague showed that he effectively equated working on the military with working with the military, 
and that any support for a scholarship of things military was already a sign of cooptation, it felt like a 
slap in the face. When she helped a veteran secure college venue for Veterans Day story-telling circles, 
films, and panels, her peace-activist friends signaled dismay. One intimated that our project was itself 
not only militarized, but militarizing, participating in “war glorification.” In a significant way, we had 
inadvertently become aligned, in some community lenses, with our own critical object. Sensible of this, 
we made adjustments such as explicitly stating the events were neither about military bolstering nor 
about protesting the wars. For example, we shared two minutes of silence “for all those touched by 
war” as the centerpiece of the event. These two minutes, held at 11 a.m. on the 11th day of the 11th 
month (and it was 2011 as well), invoked the ceasefire commemorated as Armistice Day, as Veterans 
Day was called until 1954, originally marking the end of WWI. 
However, once again such attempts at creating relatively neutral middle grounds, or safe spaces for 
collective community accounting for wars we fund, may indeed ring naïve and futile for those who 
have learned that it is a question of choosing a side, and being acutely aware of who controlled the 
territory where one treaded. In certain moments, critique and empathy are not compatible. Our 
biographies-in-the-making reflect the dissatisfaction with which we are left. To do constructivist 
critique, we now seek not only subjects, but also agendas, for which we can feel passion and 
commitment. 
 
Eyal: Ethnographic research on the military for me has always involved finding a thoughtful reflective 
stance towards the objects and subjects of my study. The mixture of empathy – or my ability to 
experientially understand another person's perspective – and critique – the move to uncover the 
dimensions of power, violence and domination involved in the actions of armed forces – necessitates 
an ongoing process of reflection. While true of any research, this reflective process is of special 
importance in regard to the study of the military since the armed forces are the organization charged 
with the use of legitimate (if sometimes contested) state violence. And violence in the societies to 
which we belong (and within the disciplines within which we are embedded) evokes the strongest 
emotions, moral sentiments and, deeply held assumptions. 
Being an Israeli man of my generation (I was conscripted in 1972 and participated in the war of 1973 
in the Egyptian front) I found that my first foray into military studies was especially difficult. Indeed, of 
all my studies, by far the most difficult has been my work on the Israeli military and specifically about 
the unit to which I belonged. As I wrote in the ethnography that came out of my study, my research 
involved negotiating the "right" distance from my own society in order to be able to study it. In this 
sense, I had a need to devise techniques, not so much for getting into a new culture, as for getting out 
of all too familiar surroundings. And these techniques seem to be especially important for the study of 
matters that touch upon some very basic (and emotionally loaded) issues such as military and 
masculine identities, assumptions about military service and armed conflict, and images of soldiering 
and enemies. I used a variety of methods and procedures to strive towards this critical distancing. One 
approach involved the study of language. Another included deliberate attempts at defamiliarizing my 






Yet with the benefit of three decades of studying the armed forces and four decades of travelling the 
routes of anthropology, the invitation to participate in this discussion also aroused reflections on much 
of what is going on in contemporary US-based anthropology and especially my observation that 
current-day US-based anthropologists feel somehow compelled to see "the ethical" and "ethics" in any 
research project or indeed critical reflection. In other words, exploring links between empathy and 
critical reflection has become much more than an intellectual issue. It entails more than the emphasis 
on individual and (especially in the American case) legal responsibility during and after fieldwork. 
Similarly, it entails much more than the process of finding a fruitful move between empathy and 
critique. Rather, it has also come to entail deeply political matters such as positioning oneself in the 
field and within the discipline, contentions about the worthiness of collective action and the 
transformational capacities of anthropologists, and ways of belonging to different political and 
ideological camps. 
Engaging with questions of critique concerning the armed forces is especially difficult because so much 
of the current debate about the anthropology of the military within the United States is colored by 
deep-rooted assumptions about the political past of anthropology (almost always insidious). For 
generations of US-based anthropologists, any study of the military is colored by the experience of 
Vietnam and intensified by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the continued power of the "American 
Empire". The combination of America's puritan streak and the intense polarization of political 
discourse serve to intensify this development. 
Thus, as I see it, the problem at base of this debate is the premise that anthropologists study, and are 
committed to, subordinate groups who are "most worthy" of empathy rather than the dominant, the 
powerful who are "most worthy" of critique. This is so because underlying the genuine commitment 
to “do no harm” and even “do good” to the people anthropologists study, there is a political agenda 
broadly termed post-colonial: to “just-ing,” to redeeming the past of anthropology. The question that 
follows then is: can anthropologists be truly empathic as a basis for critiquing the professional 
perpetrators of violence? Since empathy is culturally constructed and since anthropologists belong to 
the culture of academic anthropology, do they not operate with implicit hierarchies of "who is worthy 
of empathy" and “who is worthy of critique”? 
 
Kevin: I would like to pick up on two points from the conversation so far. The first is inspired by Eyal’s 
provocation that anthropology’s recent encounters with things military may partially be read in terms 
of a reckoning with its own troubled political past, implicitly shaping contemporary disciplinary norms 
of critique, its valences and hierarchies. My own particular disciplinary home is sociology, where 
considerations of war and the military have historically not been central disciplinary concerns. Rather 
the historical constitution of the sociological imagination and its disciplinary gaze has predominantly 
taken place by looking inwards at stratifications and inequalities within assumed pacific societies. As 
such, and resonating here with Sarah’s and Jean’s reflections upon how their ethnographic concerns 
with things military have on occasion been viewed in terms of naïve alignment or even militarized co-
optation, I have also encountered disciplinary suspicion when doing and presenting ethnographic work 
on things military, particularly work exploring the contours of military pleasure, as have colleagues 
working on similar concerns. Such marginalization, whilst experienced individually, functions 
structurally to buttress a particular historical self-understanding of the center and purity of a ‘critical’ 





affective contagion of any sustained analytic engagement with things military. Put differently, 
sociological traditions of analysis and norms of critique may be more entangled with the exclusion, 
rather than the redemption, of academic work on things military, work that nonetheless may similarly 
be felt to be dirty by default. 
The second point is to concur with my fellow discussants in endorsing a form of critique or critical 
ethnography that tries to go beyond any reductive denunciation of things military, beyond ‘critique-
as-war’ in Sarah’s and Jean’s memorable formulation. Critique understood as attempts to engage with 
complexity, to enable teeming and messy lived experience to speak back to theory, and to 
acknowledge and bring to light the forms of criticality and ambiguities that exist within militaries and 
militarized spaces themselves, to ‘make known so as to make room to maneuver’ in Zoe’s terms. This 
type of critical scrutiny and endeavor is less transcendent and assured, more discomforting and open-
ended, more prepared to view critique as an ongoing mundane joint accomplishment, and more willing 
to embrace and continuously think through and negotiate the risks and tensions of ‘strategic 
complicity’ (Jauregui 2013) rather than seek the moral certainties of detachment. 
 
Sarah and Jean: This set of ruminations raises a number of issues. First, on a meta-level, we found 
notable that as a group attentive to epistemology, we instinctively tweaked the question, approaching 
what constitutes critical ethnography via the ethnographer her- or himself. Three of us focused at least 
in part on how the person, already positioned in specific contexts involving “things military” in order 
to do ethnography, repositions him- or herself via fieldwork, not only distancing oneself from a 
previous, focalized identity, but specifically gaining intimacy with positions that might contrast this 
standpoint. Our personal trajectories, whether as an Israeli officer (in Eyal’s case) or as peace activists 
in Zoë’s and our own cases, involved passages that encompassed increasingly pluralized standpoints. 
At times we came to embody the same multivocal, often internally contradictory positions, what Kevin 
refers to as hybridity, that our ethnographies sought to capture and represent.  
Second, we seem to share a concern with critical ethnography of “things military,” terrain that is 
intrinsically political, that in one way or another tips over into being overly politicized, or mere politics. 
Cautions about the impulse to reach for a “righteous” ethical unitary reflect this. Ethnographic 
representations can recreate the very disjunctures and clashing viewpoints that underlie conflicts with 
military components (and here we appreciate Zoë’s stipulations about how contexts vary). These 
would, naturally, tend to embody the very contradictions they represent, and not be neatly sewn-up 
arguments. Alternatively, one can chose a side, and ethnographically pronounce the “primacy of the 
[aka one, singular] ethical” along lines both Eyal and Zoë tie to Nancy Scheper-Hughes and others. We 
are tempted to infer that in order to be the boundary crossers we may need to be to produce complex, 
empathetic work on things military, we feel the need to construct a different kind of boundary that we 
don’t willingly cross. On the other side of this line, ethnography becomes purely denunciatory, self-
righteous, and most of all, politically prescriptive. 
Eyal concludes by asking: Can anthropologists be truly empathic as a basis for critiquing the 
professional perpetrators of violence? Who’s worthy of empathy, who of critique? In studying across 
battle-lines, even as restaged in domestic settings, if one both empathizes and critiques multiple 
“sides,” this evenhandedness tempers critique-as-denunciatory, yet stops short of a neutralizing 





empathetic “promiscuity” to which we allude, may be the challenge of creating representations, and 
reframing deep logics of “arrangements and practice and imperatives of military life” to again invoke 
Zoë. This may mean leaving the ultimate political critiques to the consumers of ethnography. 
 
Zoë: One of the things these responses reveal is that, for a general anthropological public, the military 
seems to exists as a taken for granted and bounded entity in ways that other social institutions and 
assemblages of power do not, so that, as Kevin says, one thing that is critical (in the sense of urgent) 
about the ethnography of things military is that it takes place at all. This may lead to its "ontological 
undoing" which is critical in the other, generative sense. Eyal highlights the ways this has not been the 
case in the past, or all the time in the present. Certainly, much of the reaction against the HTS program 
in US anthropology could fairly be characterized in the way he does. But, as Kevin, Sarah and Jean, and 
I all show (as will, I imagine, many of the articles in this volume), the nature of critical ethnography of 
things military is hardly reducible to that. 
Eyal's comments evoke the distinction between culture and politics – and the critical revision of 
dehistoricized and antipolitical deployments of the culture concept – that so animated the field in the 
1980s and 1990s. I would refuse that distinction, as well as the idea that there is something 
problematic about the attention to ethics that, he suggests, characterizes much contemporary US 
anthropology. Anthropology of condemnation – or critique-as-war – is certainly not my project. I do 
not think that we need a militant army of barefoot anthropologists. I do, however, think (along with 
feminists of all stripes) that there is never an innocent position from which to know, no amount of 
critical distance that produces a god's eye view, and that, as anthropologists, we must find ways of 
being responsive to the often awkward and contradictory obligations produced by the positions we 
occupy in the many worlds we inhabit (see Abu-Lughod 2002). Sometimes this responsiveness is 
stickier than others, as perhaps for Sarah when in the grips of a moment of "fuckedness." But one 
cannot retreat from it. 
These dynamics operate across all fields, but it is hardly surprising that they would themselves be 
stickier in the context of war and when considering the signal institution of modern sovereignty in 
which violence remains firmly embedded with liberal democratic gonvermentality. This is a context 
that condenses and amplifies the forms and logics that shape a broader social imaginary. 
Finally, Sarah and Jean float that paradigmatic question I'm sure we've all been asked: What is to be 
done? They point to what I tend to think of as the broader ecology of knowledge projects and actions 
of which our scholarship is part. As anthropologists engaged in critique (as distinguished from, say, 
citizens, or even public intellectuals), I think it is essential to refuse the policy imperative that bears 
down on our work and seeks to value only scholarship that can be translated into recommendations 
that can be implemented. The Antipolitics Machine (Ferguson 1990) taught us that lesson decades ago. 
And for those who still cling to prescriptions as a metric of the worth of critical work, I'd say take a 
dose of The Undercommons (Harney and Moten 2013) and call me when a new day is dawning. 
 
Eyal: Throughout the years, I found myself in situations in which fellow anthropologists asked me about 
the ethics of my fieldwork when what they really meant was my political stance. I was irritated and 





and militarization, but on the much more local use of organized state violence in concrete 
circumstances. I sensed that given my focus on the actions of the professional perpetrators of violence 
(and not perpetrator-victims like injured soldiers), that some scholars wanted me to show some kind 
of allegiance to the "right" political camp of our discipline and to somehow be apologetic for studying 
the military and especially the actions of Israeli soldiers. In other words, demands for explicit 
declarations of allegiance were sounded, especially concerning research where the problems of 
empathy - and the perceived dangers of "over" identification with troops - emerge. 
How could I possibly answer the (always polite and often sincere) queries of "critical" scholars in a way 
that would not burn bridges or evolve into a dialogue of the deaf? Moreover, the emotional intensity 
of such questions posed to an Israeli anthropologist studying the use of organized state violence has 
increased significantly in the wake of the recent commotions in the American Anthropological 
Association with moves by self-styled concerned anthropologists to boycott Israeli institutions. 
Let me try anyway. Over the years I have experimented with various ideas for creating fruitful 
exchanges with "critical” scholars by carefully explicating the links between my data and theories. I 
have used a variety of sociological and anthropological theories to make sense of my work on the 
military so that the use of (to follow Kevin) multiple vocabularies shed light on diverse dimensions of 
what is to be explicated, to make clear that data could be understood via a variety of views (not only 
those that are supposed to be "critical"). In addition, I found myself writing in terms of what is deemed 
"worthy of study" within anthropology: at the interactional level where face-to-face violence takes 
place I situated my analyses not so much in terms of military organization but in terms of the use of 
violence. In fact, I found myself framing my writing in different ways for scholars of the military (mainly 
sociologists, psychologists and political scientists) and for scholars of violence (overwhelmingly 
anthropologists). 
For all this, what I still find troubling is the continued demand of many anthropologists that I clearly 
declare my political views and allegiances or unmistakably allude to them through the very vocabulary 
I used in my writing. What is it about contemporary anthropology that makes it necessary to constantly 
declare allegiances? What kind of social role do these pronouncements fulfil? And most important for 
this discussion, what kind of questions do such statements preclude? To be sure, declarative criticism 
is often a precondition for academic promotion (who in their right mind would go against the current 
in the early stages of their careers?), and outrage (or indignation, anger, and moral certitude) are 
important motivational bases for much of our work. Zoë puts it wonderfully in terms of the seductive 
potential of the good/ bad anthropology epitomized by the work of Nancy Scheper-Hughes (Scheper-
Hughes 1995). But Zoë and Sarah and Jean attest to the personal difficulties such moves entail (much 
like the ones I encountered since the end of the 1980s when I began studying the Israeli army). As I 
understand it, Zoë and Sarah and Jean found solutions to working on the military in bracketing their 
political and ethical views while doing research (like the older work of scholars of religion who 
bracketed their beliefs while doing research). That is putting aside their own views during the period 
of fieldwork and subsequent publication.  
But may I cautiously suggest that we go one step further, towards what can be called a "non-
declarative critique" that can potentially allow us to ask questions that are sometimes evaded by 
anthropologists? For example, if we understand that violence is interactive, can we then focus our 
critical gaze not only on the perpetrators but on the active role of their (to use an old fashioned word) 





sites of armed conflicts (Abufarha 2009). Such non-declarative critique could take us even further. It 
would ask us to be truly suspicious not only of state institutions like the armed forces but of our own 
disciplinary institutions and the very theories created by them (us, that is). 
 
What ethnographic moment do you recall from your own fieldwork in which the dynamic between 
empathy and critique was at stake or seemed emphasized? 
 
Sarah and Jean: The moment remains unforgettable to us both: we had been summoned to meet with 
the brigade’s commander and his public affairs officer. The lower-ranked commander of the battalion, 
with whom we’d crafted our original memo of understanding and agreement, sat back in silence 
against the wall, duly admonished and chastened. What had happened was the following: some six 
months earlier, we had been invited to interview soldiers from a battalion at Fort Carson, just back 
from a second hard tour in Iraq. Specifically, we sought to explore how stigma tied to unseen wounds 
like PTSD might prevent soldiers from seeking help. Our invitation came through the wife of a Non-
Commissioned Officer, who also worked with the Family Readiness Groups on post. She was alarmed 
at seeing things like wives who sought prescriptions from mental health professionals that were really 
for their husbands. She understood the husbands’ wariness at seeking help themselves as a cultural 
problem, and called in the anthropologists. Immediately after we concluded three days of intensive 
interviewing, however, commanders higher up the food chain communicated that they “might need 
to get” all our material back. 
We were baffled. We reminded them of our signed agreement to share any useful information, but 
that we had both agreed to protect soldier confidentiality, and so couldn’t just hand the material over. 
What commanders already knew, but we at the time still did not, was that a disproportionate number 
of soldiers from the same unit were becoming implicated in a cluster of 14 local murders between 
2006 and 2008. Soon, the national spotlight would turn to the unit. Soldiers’ post-deployment 
behavior, so frequently linked to PTSD, would whip up a legal and media storm that would rage for the 
next couple of years. 
This seismic shift meant that our relationship with the battalion commander, a lieutenant colonel, was 
fundamentally altered. Our collaboration was borne of a shared concern about post-deployment 
soldier welfare, and he was willing to risk some exposure in order to gain useful information that might 
strengthen the case for more responsiveness and resources for soldier behavioral and mental health. 
Now this shared, tacitly critical stance had landed him in trouble. Where before we’d shared with him 
ostensible empathy for the effects combat stress and trauma inflicted on soldiers, those very effects – 
and especially violent and murderous ones – had gotten ahead of all of us. For which group or 
individual was our empathy and allegiance most important: the commanders held responsible, the 
soldiers acting out after being subject to trauma, the family and community members subject to 
resultant risks and dangers? 
During the period of our extended fieldwork (2008-2013), the AAA Statement of Ethics changed. Both 
the 2009 and the 2012 statements emphasized doing “no harm”, which in itself proved too facile in 
working with a military community riven with opposing factions and conflicts of interest. The 2012 





collaborators and affected parties,” which was somewhat more helpful. Avoiding harm to “vulnerable 
populations” was most important of all, even when doing so might hazard harm to those in less 
vulnerable positions.  
Our pathways forward reflected this orientation, to protect those most vulnerable first. We did not 
hand over our materials (protecting individual soldier’s confidentiality). Neither did we “out” the 
various commanders who had given us support in writing, when doing so would have upheld our own 
reputations and professionalism. The colonel never questioned that our signed agreements to uphold 
soldier confidentiality obligated us not to surrender the data. He did request that we submit a new 
proposal directly to him, requesting his authorization for “the research,” but now with a focus on 
possibilities for future collaboration—and leaving in no-man’s-land that research, which had already 
occurred, had been officially authorized. He also asked us to put in writing some of the assurances we 
offered about not publishing soon. Though the unit would deploy again without ever signing onto the 
new proposal, the series of conversations that ensued over the months and years to come would lay 
the foundation for a complex, sometimes uneasy but also productive, continuing relationship between 
this fieldwork and Fort Carson officialdom. In return for refraining from publishing until command 
changed, we would later be permitted unparalleled access to shadow soldiers before and after 
deployments to Afghanistan. 
This instance was but the most dramatic place where the relationship between empathy and critique 
became fraught in our fieldwork. Other examples abound. In all cases, navigating the tensions required 
an assessment of discrepant positions of power and responsibility, and a willingness to compromise in 
ways that would enable us to ultimately represent the voices and experiences of those most 
vulnerable: enlisted soldiers, their families and broader community members – and in absentia, the 
lives affected in Iraq, Afghanistan and beyond. This entailed a mixture of both pushing back, and in 
turn compromising, with commanders, along with recognizing their own, lesser vulnerability. 
 
Kevin: Thinking about the question of ethnographic moments, we need to remember that war is an 
acute site for moral production, with its associated forms of military labour variously considered by 
different constituencies as exceptionally principled and selfless activity, morally ambivalent dirty work, 
or fundamentally reprehensible and inexcusable behavior. Furthermore, the expectation of being 
subject to intense ethical judgment can itself structure fieldwork encounters involving the military in 
particular ways. For example, while conducting ethnographic research on military procurement and 
arms fairs, the belief of many of my interlocutors was that the outcome of my research would 
ultimately and inevitably be a form of one-sided moral critique of their particular professional lives. 
This expectation that they would be on the end of some form of simple critical denunciation made the 
conduct of such fieldwork and the development of any empathic rapport tricky, with fieldwork 
interactions becoming structured by subtle relations of mutual suspicion and discomfort. This is not to 
suggest that a prerequisite for ethnographic knowledge production with the military must be, or 
indeed always follows on from, the establishment of particular forms of close understanding and 
empathy. Indeed, there is often a very explicit value to initial naiveté, to clearly not understanding, in 
that this can, in certain circumstances, lead to epistemic apprenticeship and the attempted explication 
of what may otherwise remain implicit and unremarked upon. Relatedly, the affordances of 
expressions of dissensus in fieldwork encounters with the military may at times likewise be the fraught 





opinions, including of course further interrogation of the assumptions that may inform our own 
situated positions and analytic agendas. Alongside empathic relations then, the very awkwardness and 
discomfort of fieldwork experiences with the military may also ultimately bridge gaps in critical 
understanding in complex and unanticipated ways. 
 
Eyal: I am thinking back thirty years to the time I served as an officer in a battalion of Israeli infantry 
reserves. I have written about this experience in Cultural Anthropology, so let me freely quote from 
that piece and then go on to offer some reflections. From mid-April to mid-May of 1988, I served a 
month-long stint with this reserve unit in the Hebron area of the West Bank. During this period my 
battalion performed all of the “usual” activities IDF (Israel Defence Forces) units are entrusted with: 
setting up roadblocks, maintaining patrols, and carrying out arrests. A few weeks after this period of 
duty I helped organize a party in a Jerusalem night club. This gathering was a farewell party to two 
officers who were leaving the battalion. Having come back deeply troubled by what I saw and felt in 
Hebron, I think that I expected the party to provide an opportunity for us to discuss, to raise questions, 
or at the very least to hint at what this particular period of duty (our first during the first Palestinian 
Intifada) had “done” or meant to us as soldiers, as human beings. In short, I expected the party to 
provide an occasion for reflection. As it turned out, hints, questions, let alone full-blown discussions 
that I had half-hoped would be heard, were not raised at all. 
The curious combination of a troubled citizen and anthropologist that marked me during and after this 
stint in the Occupied Territories questioned why this was so. Part of the answer lies, I soon realized, in 
the character of such periodic parties as opportunities for celebrating the solidarity and essential unity 
of a combat unit. This was not a suitable occasion for raising potentially divisive issues or openly 
acknowledging the personal and political difficulties many of us had endured during the time spent in 
the territories occupied by Israel. 
Beyond such answers, however, I continued to be troubled, to be disturbed by wider issues: how do 
army reservists interrelate, reconcile their experiences of serving in the territories during the Intifada 
with those of living their “normal” everyday Israeli lives? To be sure, Israeli forces have carried out 
similar “missions” associated with the occupation of the the West Bank and Gaza long before this First 
Uprising. But as it sometimes happens when one is thrust into an extreme situation, one can begin to 
examine and illuminate many features that are ordinarily rendered invisible by the “normality” of this 
same situation. So it was with the Intifada. It raised the following question: how do people perform — 
within the context of their army service — acts that are totally different from, if not in direct 
contradiction to, the way in which they behave while they are civilians? What are the mechanisms or 
techniques by which people who see themselves as members of a “normal” democratic society, cope 
with their participation in policing activities within another society that is governed by different rules 
and expectations? 
When another colleague and friend read an early version of the published article, he observed that 
permeating my whole analysis is a deep sense of guilt. Yet guilt can be a “positive” motivating force. 
Telling that tale — or, more precisely, relating my personal story to the more distanced analysis — 
provided me with a means for confronting the experience of Hebron as well as for facing some of the 
deeper implications of my actions and those of my friends and comrades. This, of course, was far from 





“psychology” of the rulers at the expense of the oppressed. Rather, I believed (and still do) that in 
order to understand the complexity of the situation one must take into account both the patterns of 
thought of those Israelis who are charged with managing the occupation of the territories, and the 
process through which someone, such as I, begins to tell you such a tale. 
Although I was rarely in direct contact with Palestinians while in Hebron, I found myself in a state of 
turmoil for weeks after my return: I did not sleep well, could not concentrate on my teaching and 
research, and was short with my children. Above all, I was very defensive about any criticism of the 
army and of the actions of soldiers in the territories. As I then only vaguely sensed and now more 
explicitly realize I took such criticism personally: that is, as attacks against my identity as an army officer 
and, through that, as an Israeli, and as assaults upon my commitment to the army and by extension to 
my own society. 
It was against this backdrop that about six months after our deployment in June I was asked to give a 
short presentation about the Intifada at a roundtable organized at my department at the Hebrew 
University. This discussion grew out of the feeling some of us held that we could and should react to 
the uprising as anthropologists and sociologists. I sensed very quickly, however, that I needed to 
present something that grew out of my own turmoil and as yet only vaguely defined questions. My 
short ten-minute talk was based on some very rough notes, and it was trying. It was my first public 
attempt to divulge a deeply personal story and to analyze some of its implications, to own up to my 
experience and yet to subject it to the anthropological scrutiny that I apply as a matter of course to my 
normal subjects of research. 
Looking back at my experience, it seems that the most difficult problem for me was that I empathized 
too much with my fellow soldiers. I was part of a rather cohesive group of officers, and by writing and 
being critical I felt I was somehow betraying them and the trust we had developed. It was like going 
around their back and saying bad things. But this was doubly difficult since it felt like alienating part of 
myself - a coming to terms with the boundaries of my own sense of belonging and political views. Yet 
empathy also helped me not only to understand the meaning of military service for many Jewish men 
of my generation but the emotional commitment, unsaid and unarticulated, to this army way of life 
 
Zoë: The question about ethnographic moments is certainly one that I have been asked before, and 
one that sometimes seems implicit in others. For example, that question seems to lurk within the 
request to explain (or sometimes justify) my choice and the choice of others working on issues of post-
9/11 US soldier and veteran life to not write about the experience of Iraqis and Afghanis. The question 
is important, and one to which I have given many answers: that I wanted to focus on one world, rather 
than offer a project that theorized the relation between multiple ones; that I could not meaningfully 
cultivate the expertise needed to do justice to both worlds; that some projects — like Lesley Gill’s 
School of the America’s (2004) — do try to do that; that an earlier multisited version of my project that 
would have included Afghan refugees was too unwieldy for a dissertation; that I offer this account as 
one that I hope will be read alongside others that are about the experiences of Iraqis or Afghanis, like 
Hayder Al-Mohammad’s (2012), as well as the experience of other kinds of soldiers from other kinds 
of places in other kinds of wars and other people with injuries, illnesses, or impairments or with other 





This couched question, which is about the way my own antiwar politics might inform or be contradicted 
by my ethnographic work, is also implicit in the sense that others sometimes claim that my 
ethnographic research should have an instrumentally anti-war aim. I remember a beloved and 
enthusiastic professor of mine remarking that by doing fieldwork with US soldiers I would be venturing 
into “the belly of the beast” and would therefore have special insider knowledge I could exploit for the 
common anti-war, and anti-imperialist cause.  This may be true, but it is also not one of the reasons 
that I have chosen to work on things military.  
So, I suppose that instead of offering an ethnographic moment in which the dynamic between empathy 
and critique was emphasized, I have given us slightly autoethnographic reflections triggered by a 
paranoid feeling that empathy and critique are formed as opposites in the context of things military. 
But of course, just because you’re paranoid, doesn’t mean that the overburdened ethical morass of 
working on things military isn’t out to get you. 
Reading Eyal’s reflections, in particular that a critical perspective somehow felt like 'going around the 
backs' of his fellow soldiers and 'saying bad things,' I was reminded of one definition of anthropology 
that I sometimes like to share with my students: anthropology is the science of gossip. This astute 
observation comes from one of the Brazilian women with whom Alex Edmonds conducted fieldwork 
on the politics of plastic surgery in Brazil. If we credit our interlocutors' accounts of their worlds, we 
ought also to credit their accounts of our interventions into them.  
In at least some ways then, it seems the dilemmas of working on 'things military' are no different than 
those of anthropology of any other thing. The dilemmas of objectification, translation, and mediation 
that are inherent parts of the practice of ethnographic writing and knowledge making are the same. 
So is the irreducibly extractive nature of the enterprise, in which we as academics generate value in a 
sphere to which our interlocutors generally have no access, and for which they have little use. And this 
contributes to the awkwardness of the relationships we have with our informants, even when they are 
cut of the same racial, ethnic, social, gendered, and classed cloth as we are.  
But what of the differences that war makes? What of the ways that the particularities of a situation 
surface in these encounters? A situation in which the object of ethnographic analysis is bound to state 
sanctioned violence and characterized by the profoundly illiberal reconfigurations of sovereignty that 
are the (not so) secret guarantors of liberal democracy (something Ken MacLeish's work shows so well 
in the US case)? These must also shape the contours, considerations, and consequences of both 
fieldwork and the knowledge we make of it. We might read this difference in Eyal's sense that a 
distanced and abstracted presentation of his fieldwork findings just wouldn’t do. War, and military 
institutions, are exceptional by definition. So, while all the dilemmas of the inequalities inherent to the 
science of gossip still certainly apply, the exceptional nature of things military, and in particular, their 
necessary connection to sovereign violence, also need to be acknowledged. 
During preliminary fieldwork at the US Army's Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in southern Germany 
in 2006, I was introduced to an Army officer while getting a tour of the hospital shortly after my arrival. 
In my own explanation to her of what anthropology was (not as succinct as 'the science of gossip'), I 
emphasized that we try to learn through practices, rather than just questions. She then suggested very 
seriously that I should enlist. Eyal is of course not the only anthropologist who has written about a 
military from their experience as a member, and at that point, I had read the work of a few, including 





much of that work to be frustratingly anti-political, focusing on questions of 'military culture' divorced 
from the boarder social and political formations of which they were part. On the one hand, as I've said 
before, I didn't conceptualize my project as a venture into 'the belly of the beast' out of which I would 
craft a text patterned on the political arguments of the anti-war left (to which I certainly belonged). 
On the other, I was interested in understanding how political formations seemed to appear and 
disappear across different scales or from one vantage to another. The suggestion that I should join the 
military seemed antithetical to this project. Perhaps most immediately, there was my unwillingness to 
sign whatever bodily sovereignty I had over to the state or to so directly support the military efforts to 
which I was morally and politically opposed (it is important to note that I could enact these 
commitments because of the race and class privilege that offered me a set of appealing life options 
without such a contract).  But beyond that, it seemed like joining the military was likely to force my 
perspective into a single scale, to wed me to the questions of 'military culture' that seemed to suck the 
politics out of so many of the texts I'd read by anthropologists and sociologists who had been members 
of those militaries themselves. The reasons for that are complex, and I would not want to subsume 
them under the banner of 'empathy,' in part because they are deeply political and operate on many 
scales, not only that of the individuated feeling conjured by that term. Though, while we tend to forget 
it, feelings are deeply political, including ones like empathy and pain which are so often rendered as 
uniquely contained within one individual's experience. Perhaps then we might revisit the question of 
empathy in terms of its politics and question the conditions under which empathy between an 
anthropologist and an interlocutor, or between two members of the same military, can be granted, 
expected, protected, made antithetical to critique, or used to evacuate politics from a space--the 








Abu-Lughod, Lila. 2002. Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on 
Cultural Relativism and Its Others. American Anthropologist, 104(3): 783–790. 
Abufarha, Nasser. 2009. The making of a human bomb, an ethnography of Palestinian resistance, 
Durham, N.C: Duke University Press. 
Al-Mohammad, Hayder. 2012. A kidnapping in Basra: The Struggles and Precariousness of Life in 
Postinvasion Iraq. Cultural Anthropology, 27(4): 597–614. 
Belkin, Aaron. 2012. Bring Me Men: Military Masculinity and the Benign Façade of American Empire 
1989–2001. London: Hurst and Company. 
Biehl, João & McKay, Ramah. 2012. Ethnography as Political Critique. Anthropological Quarterly, 85(4): 
1209–1227. 
Bubandt, Niels & Willerslev, Rane. 2015. The Dark Side of Empathy: Mimesis, Deception, and the Magic 
of Alterity. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 57(1): 5–34. 
Butler, Judith. 2009. Critique, Dissent, Disciplinarity. Critical Inquiry, 35(4): 773-795. 
Butler, Judith. 2002. What is Critique? An Essay on Foucault’s Virtue. In Ingham, D. (Ed.) The Political. 
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 212-226. 
Fassin, Didier. 2017. The endurance of critique. Anthropological Theory, 17(1): 4–29. 
Ferguson, James. 1990. The anti-politics machine, "development", depoliticization, and bureaucratic 
power in Lesotho, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Foucault, Michel. 2007. What is critique? In Foucaul, Michel, The Politics of Truth. Los Angeles: 
Semiotext(e). 41-81. 
Gill, Lesley. 2004. The school of the Americas, military training and political violence in the Americas. 
Durham: Duke University Press. 
Gusterson, Hugh. 1997. Studying Up Revisited. PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review, 
20(1):114–119. 
Harney, Stefano & Fred Moten. 2013. The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning & Black study. New York: 
Minor Compositions. 
Hautzinger, Sarah. 2015. Fieldworking across Territorialized Terrain: From Naïve to (Pretty Much) 
Fucked. For the panel, Naiveté, Hope, Skepticism: Encounters with Diplomatic, Military, and 
Intelligence Agencies. American Anthropological Association Meetings, Denver CO. 
Hautzinger, Sarah & Scandlyn, Jean. 2014. Beyond post-traumatic stress, homefront struggles with the 
wars on terror, Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press. 
Hemmings, Clare. 2012. Affective solidarity: Feminist reflexivity and political transformation. Feminist 
Theory, 13(2): 147-161. 
Hollan, Douglas W. & Throop, C. Jason 2011. The Anthropology of Empathy: Introduction. In Hollan, D. 
W. & Throop, C. J. (Eds.) The Anthropology of Empathy: Experiencing the Lives of Others in Pacific 





Jauregui, Beatrice. 2013. Dirty Anthropology: Epistemologies of Violence and Ethical Entanglements in 
Police Ethnography. In Garriot, W. (Ed.) Policing and Contemporary Governance : The Anthropology of 
Police in Practice. New York: Palgrave. 125-153. 
Latour, Bruno. 2004. Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern. 
Critical Inquiry, 30(2):225–248. 
------------------ 2010. An Attempt at a "Compositionist Manifesto". New Literary History, 41(3): 471–490 
Macleish, Kenneth. 2015. The ethnography of good machines. Critical Military Studies, 1(1):11–22. 
Mcsorley, Kevin. 2016. Doing military fitness: physical culture, civilian leisure, and militarism. Critical 
Military Studies, 2(1-2): 1–17. 
Povinelli, Elixabeth. 2002. The cunning of recognition, indigenous alterities and the making of 
Australian multiculturalism, Durham: Duke University Press. 
Rech, Matthew. 2016. Researching at Military Airshows. In Williams, A. et al. (eds) The Routledge 
Companion to Military Research Methods, London: Routledge 
 
Scheper-Hughes, Nancy. 1995. The Primacy of the Ethical: Propositions for a Militant Anthropology. 
Current Anthropology, 36(3):409–440. 
Throop, C. Jason. 2010. Latitudes of loss: On the vicissitudes of empathy. American Ethnologist, 37(4): 
771-782. 
Wool, Zoë. 2013. On Movement: The Matter of US Soldiers’ Being After Combat. Ethnos, 78(3): 403–
433. 
------------- 2015. After war, the weight of life at Walter Reed, Durham: Duke University Press. 
 
